Muslim chroniclers record that the Indian soldiers were resolute in
battle and that the Afghans and Turks had initially been terrified by their
huge armies led by gigantic elephants. They
however also record that Indian armies were not trained to combine effectively.
Rajput armies relied on one crushing victory and their martial pride could not
face the ignominy of losing small tactical battles to win a greater war.
Becoming a captive also entailed an unacceptable loss of caste that made death
preferable to defeat. So whenever the prospect of victory faded the morale of
the Rajput armies would be totally crushed. They fought according to inflexible
rules of war and did not understand the principles of strategy and the
importance of surprise.
Indian armies had also always been deficient in war horses and their reliance
on elephants slowed them down and could often disrupt their own ranks if
wounded. Muslim armies were much better mounted and their hardy ponies trained
in rugged mountains were trained to make fast battlefield maneuvers. Indian
armies always advanced slowly in big blocks according to a fixed, and thus
predictable science that had hardly changed since it had been defined in the
third century BC in Kautilya’s Arthashastra.
Pomp and show was more important than strategy.
The hot Indian summer resulted in Indian armies choosing to only fight
during the campaigning season between the end of September and the end of March
usually marked by the festivals of Dusshera and Holi. Armies then rested in cool
palaces during the appalling heat of summer with the result that both soldiers
and their horses were weakened when they had to face invading armies. Enemies
had to be awed by magnificence and surprise, a key element in warfare, had
little part in their set piece planning. Their colorful tents and elaborate
arrangements for food, religion and comfort required a huge train of camp
followers including wives with the result that they moved slowly with a low
ratio of fighting teeth to supporting tail. The caste system also played a big
role as the masses of infantry were almost always poorly armed low caste
infantry and archers. Though they were very numerous they were poorly trained
and easily demoralized. Caste Hindus always rode on horses or elephants.
The short recurved bow, shot by mounted archers, was
another big factor in the success of Afghan and Mughal armies. Indian archers
who had been feared by Alexander’s Macedonians had degenerated into poorly
skilled low caste infantrymen. A trained Muslim mounted archer could let loose
six arrows in as many seconds while at full gallop. It was the mounted archers
that mopped up Ibrahim Lodi’s army and later crushed Rana Sangha and Hemu. The
eye of the latter was pierced by an arrow.
The courts of Indian rulers were also hotbeds of intrigue where
courtiers, priests and womenfolk, behind the scenes, jostled for influence. Rulers
were easily flattered to overlook their own weaknesses and to believe in their
invincibility. Rivals with ability, sincerity or integrity were also dangerous
in the courts of sycophants. These completely
undermined the cooperation and teamwork so vital for sustained attack or
defense. Rajput pride was a barrier to learning and new ideas, new weapons and
new battle tactics were not welcome. There was great reliance in old
traditions.
Astrology was
a major problem. The Brahmins in all
the royal courts had no conception of the importance of the opportune moment
and would not allow military movements except at times that they deemed
auspicious and after elaborate religious rituals. They were also so inward looking that they had little awareness of
external threats and did not appreciate the fact that the Afghan and Turk
invaders were a terrible menace that would destroy the very fabric of their way
of life.
Rai Pithora (1149–1192
AD), who later called himself Prithviraj
(world ruler), belonged to the Chauhan lineage
but had received the kingdom of Ajmer from his maternal
grandfather Anangpal and ruled
from his twin capitals of Ajmer and Delhi. Prithviraj
quite easily defeated Muhammad Ghori in the first Battle of
Tarain in 1191. Ghauri however
attacked the following year and Prithviraj despite having an army alleged to
have 3,000 elephants and 300,000 soldiers was defeated at the second battle and
later executed. Ghori’s victory was partly due to guile for he had by now
learned that Hindu soldiers liked to only go to battle after sunrise subsequent
to performing the rituals of their ablutions and prayers. A dawn attack
therefore caught the great army unprepared. Prithviraj’s armies did however
rally but were deceived into chasing a fake retreat to be hit by Ghori’s
mounted archers who routed them.
Prithviraj had also been let down by Rajput allies he had been waiting
for. The most important Rajput ruler was Raja Jaichandra Rathor of Kanauj whose
honour, according to legend, had been deeply offended when Prithviraj had
eloped with his daughter Samyukta seventeen years earlier. According to some
legends he had even invited Muhammad Ghori to invade India to punish
Prithviraj. His name soon became a metaphor for treachery. Despite a long
period of several hundred years from the first plundering Afghan raids to the
time the Mughals settled down, the Rajputs had learned nothing from their
setbacks but forgot no insult to their pride.
Paradoxically, although there was a large religious and cultural chasm
between Hindus and Muslims, they were remarkable tolerant about hiring
mercenary soldiers of the other faiths. There were many Muslims in all the
Hindu armies and vice versa. Maharana Pratap, was one of the few Rajput
maharajas to staunchly oppose the Mughals till the end but his army at the
battle of Haldighati (1526) had a large contingent of Afghans led by Hakim Khan
Sur. At a later time even the great Hindu hero Shivaji had many Muslims in his
army while his adversary Aurangzeb’s army was commanded by a number of Rajput
generals including Raja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur and Raja Jai Singh of Amber.
